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We study how financial distress of a significant customer impacts capital structure of suppliers.  
Using a sample of U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2013, we find that the 
suppliers of these firms increase their leverage ratio over the two years prior to the filing date. 
This change is economically significant and consistent with the bargaining power theory, which 
states that an increase in suppliers’ debt decreases the surplus available for negotiations. 
Therefore, suppliers increase their financing leverage to fortify their bargaining power with 
significant, distressed customers. We also find evidence that suppliers reduce their leverage after 
the customer reorganizes its liabilities and capital structure in the Chapter 11 process, indicating 
a return to a previous status quo.  
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The imbalance of bargaining power that exists between a supplier and a large client can 
influence the supplier’s corporate policy and even foster abusive buying practices. Demanding 
retrospective payments, extra discounts, after-sale rebates, late payments, and/or return of unsold 
goods to suppliers are some of the examples of how large clients can increase uncertainty for and 
affect suppliers financially. The importance of such influence by large clients on their suppliers 
has become more significant during and after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, during which 
many of the United States’ biggest companies experienced financial distress and moved toward 
more aggressive cash management practices. Putting more pressure on their small and powerless 
suppliers by adding to the amount of time it takes to pay them seems to be one of the most 
practical solutions they came up with as part of such practices. Referring to Procter & Gamble’s 
supplier relationship management in the aftermath of the financial crisis, for example, the Wall 
Street Journal notes, “companies that hold on to cash longer create deficits at suppliers that have 
to find financing, raise prices or squeeze other firms along the supply chain. Smaller companies 
with little bargaining power and less access to credit ultimately could see their costs rise, 
pinching funds that could otherwise be spent on hiring or investments.”3 In this paper, we study 
one of the mechanisms suppliers have to balance this bargaining power. We investigate how 
suppliers increase their bargaining power by strategically altering their capital structure in 
response to change in the riskiness of a major customer in anticipation of the customer’s distress. 
To that end, we provide new insights as part of the literature that highlights the importance of 
supplier-customer relationship in determining the capital structure of the supplier. 
A traditional approach in investigating the determinants of capital structure policy has 
been the identification of firm and market characteristics that can explain the observed level of 
 
3 Serena Ng, “P&G, Big Companies Pinch Suppliers on Payments,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2013. 
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corporate debt (Parsons and Titman, 2008). Extending this view, Titman (1984), Bronars and 
Deere (1991), and Perotti and Spier (1993), among others, investigate the possibilities of 
additional factors that might impact capital structure decisions. These factors are related to a 
firm’s competitive position and the strategy it employs in its relationships with its nonfinancial 
stakeholders, such as employees, competitors, customers, and suppliers. Building on this 
literature, we examine how a supplier adjusts its debt level in response to the impending financial 
distress of a significant customer (defined as a customer that accounts for at least 10% of a 
supplier firm’s annual sales).  
We hypothesize that the supplier reacts to a customer’s distress by increasing its debt 
level in order to fortify its bargaining position. The bargaining theory (Bronars and Deere, 1991) 
states that the firm increases its debt when the bargaining power of its counterparty increases in 
order to reduce the amount of surplus available in a negotiation. This theory is supported by 
evidence on firms that increase their debt levels when facing negotiations with strong 
nonfinancial stakeholders such as unions (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Matsa, 2010). In our 
setting, the main concern for the supplier is to keep its strategic negotiation position as strong as 
possible if it believes that the customer has substantial chances of recovery. Suppliers’ 
bargaining power is especially relevant because distressed customers may be pressing their 
suppliers to give better trade conditions such as reducing prices or extending credit. The implicit 
assumption is that in this extreme situation, other considerations for the choice of capital 
structure, such as the relation-specific investment theory from Titman (1984) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988), are less relevant.4 Additionally, we hypothesize that this strategic negotiation 
 
4 Relation-specific investment theory states that suppliers and customers choose their capital structure in order to 
minimize costs of distress in a possible future situation. In our setting, the customer is already in distress in the years 
preceding Chapter 11 filing, and bargaining power considerations during upcoming contract negotiations are more 
relevant for leverage decisions. 
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move is temporary, with the supplier returning to a previous relative status quo when the 
distressed customer reemerges from Chapter 11 after reorganization.   
We analyze the changes in capital structure of suppliers during a period of customer 
financial distress. We construct the sample of such suppliers using comprehensive data on 
reported supplier-customer relationships from the Compustat Customer Segment database and 
bankruptcy filings between 1980 and 2013 from the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. 
We document empirical evidence that suppliers of distressed customers use an increase in debt as 
a strategic tool to keep or improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis distressed customers in the 
two years before the customers file for Chapter 11, provided that the customers reorganize and 
reemerge from Chapter 11. We also find evidence of reduction in their debt levels after the 
customers reorganize in Chapter 11, indicating that the strategic negotiation move was 
temporary.  
Another possible explanation for the observed increase in supplier leverage is that 
suppliers act as liquidity providers to their important customers in distress. Under this 
explanation, suppliers borrow to finance additional trade credit to their distressed customers that 
cannot obtain financing on their own. If this trade credit is the underlying mechanism we would 
also observe a temporary increase in the supplier’s total debt because of the increase in the 
supplier’s current liabilities. We discriminate between the trade credit and bargaining power 
hypotheses by examining the behavior of both short-term and long-term debt ratios. Based on the 
bargaining power explanation, suppliers are interested in arguing during renegotiations that they 
do not have the flexibility to offer better prices and that their ability to extend credit is limited 
because they have to meet their own debt obligations. Consequently, these suppliers increase not 
only their short-term debt but also their long-term debt obligations to generate more credibility 
during negotiations with a distressed client about their leverage induced constraints. In contrast, 
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if the trade credit channel is the reason for the increase in suppliers’ leverage, it should result in 
increases in short-term debt ratios rather than long-term debt ratios. Consistent with this 
reasoning, we first document that while suppliers’ short-term debt ratio is positively related to 
their accounts receivable ratio, their long-term debt ratio is unrelated to the trade credit they 
provide to their customers. Thus, while increases in trade credit may potentially account for 
increases in the short-term debt ratio, it is unlikely to explain changes in the long-term debt ratio.  
We show that there is a statistically significant increase in both the suppliers’ short-term 
and long-term debt ratios during the customers’ distress years. While the increase in long-term 
debt ratios supports the bargaining power hypothesis, it is unclear whether the increase in short-
term debt ratio is driven by the trade credit mechanism or bargaining power considerations or 
both. We explore this issue in two ways.  
First, we examine whether there is an unusual increase in suppliers’ accounts receivable 
ratios when a significant customer is in financial distress. Employing control variables identified 
in prior empirical studies of trade credit, we find no unusual increase in suppliers’ trade credit 
when the customer is in financial distress. This result raises doubts about the trade credit based 
explanation of the observed increase in leverage prior to customer bankruptcy.  
Second, we conduct a more detailed examination by using a two-stage model to explicitly 
control for the impact of unusual changes in the accounts receivable ratio on the various leverage 
measures. In the first-stage, we estimate the abnormal level of the accounts receivable ratio after 
controlling for determinants other than leverage that have been identified in the prior literature 
on trade credit; in the second stage, we include the measure of abnormal accounts receivable as 
an additional control variable in our analysis of financial leverage during customer financial 
distress. The analysis reveals a significant increase in both short-term and long-term financial 
leverage during financial distress of a significant customer even after controlling for the impact 
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of changes in the suppliers’ trade credit. There is no diminution of the increase in the short-term 
debt ratio during customer financial distress when the abnormal accounts receivable ratio is 
added as an explanatory variable; the statistical significance of the leverage increase is however 
much stronger for long-term leverage compared to short-term leverage. This result points 
strongly to the role of bargaining considerations as an important driver of supplier financial 
leverage during periods of customer financial distress. 
We conduct a number of robustness tests to support our conclusions about the bargaining 
power hypothesis. We use a benchmark sample to test whether other factors can be driving our 
results, such as changes in leverage attributable to the dynamics in the supplier’s industry rather 
than customer financial distress. Benchmark suppliers in the same industries as treatment 
suppliers do not change their leverage during the years of interest if they do not have a business 
relationship with a distressed customer. Next, we examine the impact of supplier industry 
concentration. If the supplier’s industry is concentrated, the supplier should possess higher 
bargaining power and is less likely to resort to increasing leverage in order to boost its 
bargaining power with a distressed customer. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that greater 
concentration in the supplier’s industry is associated with lower increases in the supplier’s debt. 
Furthermore, we argue that suppliers assess the ex-ante probability of continuing the 
business relationship with the distressed customers while deciding on appropriate capital 
structure responses. If a customer is likely to be liquidated, the supplier will not bother to 
increase financial leverage. Consistent with this reasoning, in the case of customers that are 
liquidated after filing for Chapter 11, we find no evidence of changes in the suppliers’ debt level.  
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that financial leverage is used as a 
tool to determine how economic rents are divided between suppliers and customers. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the 
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data, the sample construction method, and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results and 
analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Our paper builds on a series of related papers on the effects of distress and bankruptcy on 
external stakeholders. Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate the effect of bankruptcy announcements 
(Chapter 11 filing) on the equity value of a firm’s competitors. They find significant effects, 
either positive or negative, depending primarily on the degree of concentration or leverage in the 
industry. They call this effect a “contagion effect” when it is negative and a “competitive effect” 
when it is positive. They argue that the latter is driven by an increase in market power of the 
surviving competitors. Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997) extend this empirical research by 
examining the extent to which a firm’s bankruptcy impacts the valuation of its competitors, 
finding contagion effects for large and small firm bankruptcies but not finding competitive 
effects on the days centered around the Chapter 11 announcements. Slovin, Sushka, and 
Polonchek (1999) find both contagion and competitive effects in the banking industry. Hertzel, 
Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) investigate the valuation implications of distress and bankruptcy 
on suppliers and customers of distressed firms, as well as how these effects interact with the 
wealth effects for industry rivals. They find that there are significant prefiling and filing date 
contagion effects extending not only to competitors but also to suppliers of the bankrupt firm.5 
Moreover, they find that suppliers’ contagion effects are more severe when the intra-industry 
competitors of the filing firm also suffer contagion.  
Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian (2015) study the nature of “spillover effects” of financial 
distress, where distress of a given firm is associated with negative equity returns to rivals, 
 
5 However, customers of distressed firms do not experience contagion effects. 
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suppliers, and customers. They measure the extent to which expected costs of replacing a 
distressed customer explain spillover costs for suppliers. They find that selling, general, and 
administrative (SGA) costs of suppliers increase, reducing their profitability during the year of 
the customer’s bankruptcy filing. Based on further analysis, they report that suppliers to 
financially distressed companies that are highly likely to reorganize in bankruptcy incur little or 
no spillover costs. However, suppliers to economically (rather than financially) distressed firms 
experience large losses in market value, which are linked to proxies for the cost of replacing their 
bankrupt customer. These papers assume a passive role for suppliers’ financial policy. Our paper 
extends this literature by exploring an additional channel in which a major customer’s distress 
affects suppliers, namely the suppliers’ capital structure. Specifically, we investigate whether 
suppliers strategically increase leverage in order to countervail the bargaining power of 
significant, distressed customers. 
This paper is related to the work on the impact of supplier-customer strategic 
relationships on corporate capital structure. Titman’s (1984) seminal paper argues that switching 
costs are uniquely high when the supplier’s products are specific to the relationship and the 
supplier is liquidated. He shows that these costs affect the supplier’s choice of capital structure, 
and the supplier commits to a liquidation policy (lower leverage levels) that takes into account 
the effects on its customers. Titman and Wessels (1988) also argue that firms in durable goods 
industries choose lower leverage to assuage customer concerns; forced liquidation of suppliers 
imposes costs on their customers that have to switch suppliers.  
Providing empirical evidence consistent with the arguments of Titman (1984) and Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) show that firms in bilateral 
relationships are likely to produce or procure unique products, especially when they are in 
durable goods industries, and that such firms maintain lower leverage. Kale and Shahrur (2007) 
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also find empirical evidence that firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism that 
enables customers and suppliers to undertake relation-specific investments. Therefore, the 
relation-specific investment theory argues that debt is harmful in enticing investments specific to 
the supplier-customer relationship. Thus, the supplier will decrease its leverage if a significant 
customer increases leverage to reduce the risk of relationship-specific investments. Such 
reactions lead to a negative relation between supplier and customer debt levels.  
Espousing a different view, several researchers (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Bronars and 
Deere, 1991; Chu, 2012; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Hennessy and Livdan, 2009; Matsa, 
2010) develop and test the bargaining theory arguments in the context of a firm’s financial 
leverage decision. This theory states that when a firm increases its leverage, it increases its 
bargaining power with its customers and suppliers. Consequently, the bargaining theory predicts 
a positive leverage relationship between suppliers and customers in contrast with the relation-
specific investment theory of Titman (1984). For instance, if a customer increases its leverage, it 
increases its bargaining power with its suppliers. The suppliers may respond by increasing their 
own leverage in order to not lose their bargaining power. Kale and Shahrur (2007) investigate the 
bargaining role for debt and find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of 
concentration in supplier/customer industries, which proxies for bargaining power. Brown, Fee 
and Thomas (2009) find that suppliers experience significantly negative abnormal returns at the 
announcements of customer leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Their argument is that LBO creates an 
opportunity for a firm to extract concessions from its suppliers because of the improved 
bargaining power conferred by higher leverage. Towner (2015) uses the health-care industry to 
test the bargaining power theory and its effectiveness. He shows that reimbursement rates 
negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific procedure are higher when the hospital 
has more debt. He also shows that this effect is stronger when hospitals have less ex ante 
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bargaining power relative to insurers and that hospitals take on more debt when they have less 
bargaining power.  
Chu and Wang (2011) test both the bargaining power and relation-specific investment  
theories and find that the positive leverage relationship is dominant and significant, but also that 
the positive relationship is weaker if it requires more relation-specific investments, thus 
confirming the existence of both phenomena. Demirci (2013) investigates the notion that 
customer risk is an important determinant of suppliers’ financing decisions. She uses customers’ 
credit ratings, stock return volatility, and industry-adjusted book leverage as proxies of 
customers’ risks to identify the impact on suppliers’ leverage and net debt issuance. She finds 
that when customer risk is proxied by credit ratings or stock return volatility, it has a negative 
impact on supplier’s debt financing, and that young firms and firms operating in concentrated 
industries are more sensitive to changes in customer risk. However, in contrast to Chu and Wang 
(2011), she does not find a statistically significant relationship between customer book leverage 
and supplier book leverage in her sample. Our paper is different from these studies in that we 
focus on a time window of acute customer financial distress during which bargaining power in 
contract renegotiations assumes added importance for suppliers’ leverage decisions. 
An alternative channel through which a supplier’s capital structure is affected by its 
relationship with a customer is through trade credit provision (Cunat, 2006; Fisman and Love, 
2003; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2011; Ng, Smith, and Smith, 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) distinguish between large suppliers and small suppliers. They argue 
that large suppliers have financing advantages. That is, they can receive bank loan more easily 
and at a cheaper price than their customers. Also by routinely monitoring repayments, these 
suppliers have better information about their customer than lending financial institutions do. 
Further, Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that suppliers that are more creditworthy and have 
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access to financing offer more trade credit. Lastly, small suppliers provide less trade credit. 
Gathering information on credit terms offered by suppliers by using survey data, Ng, Smith and 
Smith (1999) find that credit terms between suppliers and customers are industry-specific, and 
that these terms are stable over time. The authors conclude that information asymmetries 
between suppliers and their customers and customers’ reputation are important in the design of 
trade credit contracts. Ng et al. (1999), however, do not find results consistent with the theories 
of trade credit that suggest liquidity of the supplier is a primary determinant in the decision to 
extend credit, nor did they find support for the notion that suppliers who face variable demand 
prefer to alter credit terms in lieu of price to deal with fluctuations. Comparing trade credit with 
bank credit, Cunat (2006) finds that the relatively high implicit interest rates of trade credit are 
the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplified whenever suppliers face a 
relatively high cost of funds. Implicitly assuming large suppliers dealing with small customers, 
the author finds that suppliers have a comparative advantage over banks in enforcing their 
contracts because they are able to stop the supply of intermediate goods.  
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011) provide the most relevant work. Using 30,000 actual 
trade credit contracts between small suppliers and large buyers in the United States and Europe, 
they test the validity of existing theories in the trade credit literature. This paper is relevant 
because like them, our sample includes a few large clients and a larger number of relatively 
small suppliers. Looking at both sides of the contract in their data set, they argue that because 
suppliers that extend credit are generally small, lesser-known firms they are unlikely to have 
access to cheaper financing. Rejecting the financing advantage argument, they provide 
alternative explanations for why these suppliers should extend credit to larger borrowers. Trade 
credit is a means for suppliers to provide a warranty assuring customers of product quality. They 
also conclude that trade credit provides a means for the buyer to exercise market power and to 
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squeeze smaller suppliers. This evidence indicates that the supplier-customer financial 
relationship is influenced by bargaining considerations.   
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample construction 
We use the LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (hereafter, bankruptcy data set) to 
identify all Chapter 11 filings between 1980 and 2013 (980 filings).6 The firms in the bankruptcy 
data set have assets of at least $100 million in 1980 dollars at the time of filing, and each has at 
least one publicly traded security. We match these firms to all firms reported as significant 
customers in the Compustat Customer Segment database (hereafter, customer data set).  
The customer data set contains the list of significant customers, defined as a firm that 
accounts for at least 10% of the total sales revenue of a supplier. This requirement was 
established by the SEC under FASB 14 (1976). As of January 1998, under FASB 131 (1997), 
firms are no longer required to report the identity of their principal customers, but they still need 
to report the sales to each of them; many firms continue to disclose the identity of their principal 
customers voluntarily.  
Significant customers are identified only by their names, which are sometimes 
abbreviated. Therefore, we run the “reclink” Stata algorithm to match customer names in the 
customer data set with the firms that filed for Chapter 11 and manually inspect all matches for 
accuracy.7 Our matched sample includes 6,516 pair-year observations. We look for matches up 
to 10 years before and after the Chapter 11 filing date, following Hertzel et al. (2008) and Kolay 
et al. (2015). We gather financial data for all firms from the Compustat Fundamental Annual 
 
6 http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm, last accessed January 31, 2016. 
7 Stata's record linking program “reclink" written by Michael Blasnik available at 
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/r, last accessed January 31, 2016. 
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database from 1980 to 2013. We require that all firms have non-missing data for the variables 
used in the subsequent analyses (these variables are described in Section 3.3). We identify 795 
suppliers to 207 customers that filed for bankruptcy. 
We exclude suppliers in the following industry classifications: utilities, financials, and 
public administration (SIC codes 4900–4999, 6000–6999 and 9000–9999). After this step, we 
have 751 suppliers with 195 bankrupt customers.8 Following Li and Tang (2016) and Demirci 
(2013), we conservatively discard all supplier-customer pairs that have only one or two years of 
matching to filter out temporary/short-lived relationships. We obtain 386 supplier-customer pairs 
with long-standing reported relationships of three years or more. This sample contains 358 
suppliers and 94 filing customers.9 
 
3.1.1. Identification of financial distress 
Because we want to examine the leverage of suppliers during the period of customers’ 
distress, we must first identify customer distress years. Figure 1 with the number line indicates 
our dating convention. The numbers correspond to the end of each fiscal year for the supplier. 
“F” denotes the Chapter 11 filing date of a significant customer, which occurs between end of 
fiscal years –1 and 0. Thus, the supplier’s Year -2 financial leverage is observed anywhere 
between 12 and 24 months before the customer’s bankruptcy filing date.  In our sample, we 
require a supplier-customer relationship reported in at least one of the three years: –2, –1, and 0. 
This additional condition generates our final treatment sample with 156 suppliers and 62 
 
8 We include customers that are in finance and utilities industries in our sample following Hertzel et al. (2008) and 
Kolay et al. (2015). Because we focus on the effects on their suppliers rather than on the filing customers 
themselves, we do not expect their different treatment under Chapter 11 to affect our results. Nevertheless, we repeat 
our tests after dropping these customers and find that results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
9 The imposition of a minimum of three years of reported relationships is the key difference compared to Kolay, et 
al. (2015); otherwise, we get a similar sample size. 
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customers. We consider years –2 and –1 as customer distress years, per the discussion below. 
Year 0 is considered as a transition year between distress and the start of reorganization. 
Figure 1 
Dating convention of key years examined in the analysis. 
  
Hertzel et al. (2008) identify the firm distress day by the date of the most significant 
abnormal drop in the market value of the filing firm in the preceding year leading up to the 
bankruptcy filing, which in our convention could be located in year –1 or year 0. Kolay et al. 
(2015) focus on the date where information about distress is released prior to Chapter 11, and 
they search LexisNexis for the first announcement that the firm is negotiating or has already 
negotiated with creditors, or has defaulted. Using this methodology, they find that on average, a 
firm’s distress announcement date occurs 99 days after the value loss day advocated by Hertzel 
et al. (2008). Kolay et al. (2015) measure filing customers’ characteristics using Compustat data 
in the two years preceding the distress announcement dates. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1994) define financial distress based on interest coverage ratios. A firm is classified as 
financially distressed if in any two years after issuing junk bonds its EBITDA is less than its 
reported interest expense, or if in any one year EBITDA is less than 80% of its interest expense. 
They argue that selecting distressed firms using stock market information, as used in Gilson, 
John and Lang (1990), may be misleading because stock market performance measures may 
include some information about the ability of a firm to cope with financial distress. If the market 
perceives that a particular company will be able to costlessly resolve its financial distress, the 
market will not be severely negative on the stock valuation, and the sample will be biased to 
firms with relatively costly financial distress. Although we fundamentally agree with the 




arguments of Asquith et al. (1994), when the approach using interest expenses is tried in our 
sample, we identify a very small number of firm-years as distress years. Therefore, to obtain a 
larger sample, we select a less conservative approach considering the two years before filing for 
Chapter 11, years –2 and –1, as a good approximation of the distress years when the relevant 
negotiations and bargaining happen. We also calculate Ohlson (1980) O-scores and Altman 
(1968) Z-scores to verify that the two years before filing may be characterized as distress years. 
Our final sample consists of 163 supplier-customer pairs and 1,664 pair-year observations in the 
time window of interest, with 10.2 yearly observations per pair on average 
  
3.1.2. Summary statistics 
The time window of interest of a pair primarily includes all the years in which there is a 
reported relationship inside the limit of minus 10 and plus 10 years relative to the Chapter 11 
filing date. Because we are interested in investigating suppliers’ leverage changes before and 
after customers’ bankruptcy filing, we include supplier data up to five years after Chapter 11 
filing in the sample, even if the reported relationship ends before year +5. Suppliers with sales 
less than $10 million in 1990 dollars were dropped and observations with book leverage ratio 
greater than 1 were right-censored at 1.10 All ratio variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels to lessen the effects of outliers. In the sample there are 156 unique suppliers distributed in 
86 industries as defined by their four-digit SIC codes. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the suppliers and customer firms. We define 
Book Leverage as the book value of total debt (debt in current liabilities [dlc] + long-term debt 
[dltt]) divided by the book value of total assets (at). Market Leverage is defined as the book 
value of total debt divided by the market value of assets (market value of equity [cshpri*prcc_f] 
 
10 Alternatively, trimming observations in which supplier book leverage is greater than 1, instead of right-censoring, 
does not qualitatively change the results. 
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+ total debt + preferred stocks liquidation value [pstkl] – deferred taxes and investment credit 
[txditc]). Short-Term Leverage is short-term debt (dlc) divided by book value of assets (at). 
Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt (dltt) divided by book value of assets (at). Size is 
computed as ln(sales). Market-to-Book ratio is defined as the ratio of market value of assets to 
the book value of total assets. Profitability is the operating income before depreciation (oibdp) 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment (ppent) divided by total 
assets. R&D Intensity is total R&D expenditures (xrd) divided by total assets. This variable is 
replaced with zero when R&D expenditures are not reported. Industry Median Leverage is the 
median book leverage of the other firms in the same four-digit SIC industry classification. 
Accounts Receivable Ratio is accounts receivable (rect) divided by sales. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the suppliers, and Panel B reports 
the statistics for the customers.11 Customer firms are much larger than supplier firms; the larger 
size of customers potentially increases suppliers’ vulnerability to pressure during contract 
renegotiations. As expected, mean and median market leverage ratios of customers are 
significantly higher, more than twice the magnitude of the suppliers’ market leverage. This is due 
to customer stock prices being severely affected during the distress years. Considering the 
spillover effects to suppliers’ stock prices (Hertzel et al. (2008)), we conservatively rely on 
measures of supplier book leverage instead of supplier market leverage for our analyses. Market 
leverage is calculated using stock prices, and a decrease in supplier stock prices will increase the 
value of its market leverage, even if there is no actual change caused by issuance or retirement of 
debt or equity. Panel C reports characteristics of the total sample and the sub-samples with only 
the firms that reemerged (129 supplier-customer pairs) and only the firms that were liquidated 
(34 supplier-customer pairs).  
 




We verify that the customers can be considered to be in financial distress in the two years 
before filing for Chapter 11 by calculating the Ohlson (1980) scores (O-scores) and Altman 
(1968) Z-scores. The average O-score for customers in the sample is –0.58 over all firm-years. 
However, the average customer O-score increases from –0.81 in year –3 before filing, to –0.19 in 
year –2, to 2.04 in year –1, indicating an increase in financial distress. The average O-score 
drops to 0.31 in the filing year potentially reflecting the impact of some firms reorganizing 
quickly in Chapter 11; a positive average O-score is nonetheless indicative of financial distress. 
Similar qualitative results are obtained with Z-scores. 
 
3.2. Benchmark sample 
We also develop a sample of benchmark supplier-customer pairs for comparison to 
control for changes in unobserved market and industry factors that might have affected firms’ 
capital structure. We follow a similar matching procedure as used above for filing firms; 
however, in this instance, we match the customer data set with all Compustat companies and 
then eliminate all treatment supplier and customer firms, as well as suppliers that are financial, 
public, and utilities. Further, we restrict the benchmark sample to satisfy the following 
requirements: pairs in the same industries as treatment pairs; customers and suppliers did not file 
for Chapter 11; pairs reporting supplier-customer relationships in the same distress years as the 
treatment pairs; and pairs with Compustat data available in the same years as the treatment pairs. 
Following the multiple criteria above, and using four-, three-, and two-digit SIC industries in this 
order of priority, we manually identify a unique benchmark supplier-customer pair for 72% of 
the treatment supplier-customer pairs. 
Our benchmark sample consists of 93 supplier-customer pairs that matched pairs with 
reemerged customers in the treatment sample and 786 firm-year observations. It is not possible 
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to find benchmark pairs for 36 of the treatment pairs with reemerged customers, primarily due to 
the non-coincidence of the relationship reporting years. Again, all ratio variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels to lessen the effects of outliers. In this benchmark sample there are 86 
unique suppliers distributed in 45 industries defined by their four-digit SIC codes. Panel A of 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the benchmark suppliers, Panel B reports summary 
statistics for the benchmark customers, and Panel C reports characteristics of the benchmark 
sample. As expected, in this sample, mean and median market leverage customers' ratios are not 
substantially higher than suppliers’ ratios because customers did not file for bankruptcy 
protection and, on average, are not in distress. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Supplier leverage around customer Chapter 11 filing 
We examine the financial leverage of suppliers whose customers reorganized and 
reemerged after Chapter 11.12 If a supplier believes that its customer will liquidate, there is no 
point in adjusting capital structure in order to change its bargaining power. Implicitly, we 
propose that a supplier is informed about its customer and can form a reasonable opinion about a 
customer’s viability and the likelihood that the customer can reorganize and survive the 
bankruptcy.13 This is because when a supplier’s livelihood depends on a major customer, the 
supplier constantly assesses the customer’s assets and capabilities in order to reduce the costs of 
under-diversification. There is a constant flow of information between suppliers and customers 
through formal (order processing) and informal (meetings, phone and online conversations, and 
site visits) channels through which suppliers and customers can gain insider-like information 
 
12 In subsequent analysis, we separately investigate the financial leverage of suppliers whose customers were 
liquidated after filing for Chapter 11. 
13 We relax this assumption later by using an empirical model to predict customer reorganization or liquidation. 
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about each other. Consequently, a supplier can develop an informed evaluation of the possibility 
of recovery of the customer. 
Table 3 reports the univariate analysis for supplier book leverage. Panel A presents the 
mean and median industry-adjusted supplier book leverages from year –4 to year +4 for suppliers 
with reemerged customers.14 The timing of suppliers adopting higher leverage for bargaining 
purposes depends upon when they anticipate facing bargaining pressure from customers while 
negotiating long-term supplier contracts. It can be argued that the customer may exert more 
bargaining power when they first encounter financial difficulties. Closer to the bankruptcy filing, 
they may be in a much weaker bargaining position and may need the help of suppliers for 
survival.  
There is a substantial increase in supplier book leverage in year –2. The mean industry-
adjusted book leverage is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level in year –2 and 
marginally significant in year –1, but insignificant for all other years. Panel B presents the mean 
and median industry-adjusted supplier book leverages from year –4 to year +4 for suppliers with 
liquidated customers. In this panel, both the mean and median book leverages exhibit a trend 
with a small decrease until year –1; however, the deviations from the median industry leverage 
are not statistically significant in any year. Although the results in Panel A are not compelling, 
the univariate test results do seem to suggest that suppliers increase their leverage in the years 
before the customer files for Chapter 11 if they assess that the customer will be able to reemerge 
after Chapter 11 and, therefore, will have a continuing business relationship. 
Next, we conduct a multivariate analysis of the changes in supplier capital structure 
employing standard control variables. Equation (1) presents the model for the multivariable 
regressions with supplier’s book leverage as the dependent variable.  
 








+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
To ensure that our results are not driven by our choice in designating the period of 
customer distress, we explore two specifications. In our first specification (Model 1), 
BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the two years before the customer’s Chapter 
11 filing, years –2 and –1, and zero otherwise. The Transition dummy variable is set to 1 in the 
year of and the two years after the Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. In our second 
specification (Model 2), we split the BeforeFiling dummy in two separate dummies, one for year 
–2 and the other for year –1. BeforeFiling[–2] receives the value of one in the year –2, and zero 
otherwise. BeforeFiling[–1] receives the value of one in the year before the filing for Chapter 11, 
year –1, and zero otherwise; Transition is set to one in the year of and the two years after the 
Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. In both models, the AfterFiling dummy variable is set to 1 
in year +3 and all the subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Xi,t-1 are the controls for supplier’s 
book leverage, ui controls for firm fixed effects, μt controls for year fixed effects, and εi,t is a 
random error term. 
 Table 4 reports the results of the pooled OLS regressions using the model of Eq. (1) for 
all dummy variables’ specifications.15 The coefficients of the BeforeFiling dummies are positive 
and statistically significant. The positive relationships are also economically significant. In 
column 1, our first specification for the dummies, the coefficient implies that suppliers increase 
their leverage by 5.5% on average in the two years before the distressed customer files for 
Chapter 11. The coefficient of the Transition dummy is positive and statistically significant at 
 
15 Because the number of suppliers (125) is almost the same as the number of pairs (129) in our treatment sample, 
use of pair-year fixed effects present similar results as supplier-year fixed effects. Additionally, when errors are 
clustered by customers, a natural grouping with this sample because several customers are reported by multiple 
suppliers, the results are similar. 
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the 5% level, indicating that suppliers keep a higher leverage in these years. When dummy 
variables are used to analyze supplier leverage in years –2 and –1  separately as shown in Model 
2, the coefficients are both positive and statistically significant, indicating that suppliers maintain 
a higher leverage in year –1, after increasing it in year –2.  
The coefficients of the AfterFiling dummy are also positive but not statistically different 
from zero. Thus, the leverage levels before and after the distress and transition years are not 
significantly different. This evidence indicates that although supplier leverage increases prior to 
a significant customer’s bankruptcy filing, it eventually returns to previous levels.16 Given the 
protection during the Chapter 11 process and the expected financial restructuring of liabilities 
during reorganization, customers are no longer vulnerable to financial distress. Thus, the need for 
leverage-induced enhancement of supplier bargaining power is diminished, if not eliminated. 
Consequently, suppliers return to leverage levels deemed to be optimal under normal conditions.  
The effect and signs of the control variables in Table 4 are consistent with the literature 
(e.g., Leary and Roberts 2014), and most of these coefficients are statistically significant. The 
high R2s found in the specifications are consistent with short data panels where firm dummies 
capture a large portion of the cross-sectional variation (Flannery and Hankins 2013). In addition 
to controlling for unobservable firm and year effects, there may be common local unobservable 
economic shocks that may affect customer and supplier simultaneously. To address this concern, 
we add state fixed effects to these models in Table 4 and we find that the results are qualitatively 
unchanged and quantitatively very similar.17 
In this analysis, we have considered all suppliers whose customers reorganized 
successfully. However, suppliers may initiate leverage adjustments only if they expect the 
 
16 Note that the coefficients for the BeforeFiling, Transition and AfterFiling dummy variables measure deviations 
from supplier leverage maintained during the years prior to customer financial distress.  
17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional test. We do not tabulate these additional results in 
the interest of brevity. 
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reorganized customer to continue to be a significant customer. Based on the reported supplier-
customer relationship after the distress years, we eliminated observations where the distressed 
customer is no longer reported as a significant customer after the customer’s bankruptcy filing. 
When we estimate the models of Table 4 for this smaller sample, we obtain similar results. For 
instance, the coefficient for the BeforeFiling dummy is 0.039 compared to 0.055 reported in 
Model 1 of Table 4, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the 
AfterFiling dummy remains statistically insignificant.  In the interest of brevity, these results are 
not tabulated. 
In sum, the results indicate that the suppliers of distressed customers modify their relative 
negotiating position by increasing leverage during the years before customers file for 
bankruptcy, supporting the bargaining theory hypothesis put forward by Bronars and Deere 
(1991). The evidence also indicates that these suppliers return to their previous leverage levels a 
few years after the customers file for Chapter 11. 
 
4.2. Analysis of the alternative hypothesis based on trade credit extension  
Another possible explanation for the increase in supplier leverage before a customer files 
for Chapter 11 is that suppliers may be inclined to offer trade credit and act as liquidity providers 
to their important costumers in distress. For example, Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009) 
develop a model and investigate the trade-off between inventories and trade credit. Their 
argument is that the supplier may extend trade credit to financially constrained customers in 
order to obtain credit-financed sales, instead of accumulating costly inventories of finished goods 
that may or may not be sold in the future. Although these authors do not specifically look at 
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customers that are in distress, their arguments for a trade credit extension hypothesis are relevant 
in our setting and deserve to be investigated.18    
If suppliers increase their debt in order to extend trade credit to distressed customers who 
face constraints in accessing capital, we expect that suppliers preferentially contract short-term 
debt to match the maturity of the short-term credit they extend to their distressed customers. We 
examine the validity of this maturity matching argument in Table 5, by assessing the relationship 
of accounts receivable to short-term and long-term leverage. We rely on Dass, Kale and Nanda 
(2015), and Molina and Preve (2009) to select our control variables. The accounts receivable-to-
sales ratio is the dependent variable in all three models in Table 5 but they differ in the debt ratio 
used as an explanatory variable. Evidence reported in Table 5 confirms that trade credit is 
positively related to the total debt ratio lending credence to the argument that the increase in total 
debt ratio prior to customer distress observed in Table 4 may be driven by additional trade credit 
extended by suppliers to distressed customers. Examining Models 2 and 3, we find that, 
consistent with the maturity matching hypothesis, trade credit is positively related to the short-
term debt ratio but it is unrelated to the long-term debt ratio in our sample. Results in Table 5 
suggest that while the trade credit mechanism may lead to increases in short-term debt ratios, it is 
unlikely to explain changes in the long-term debt ratios.  
Following the bargaining power theory mechanism, suppliers are interested in arguing 
during negotiations that they do not have flexibility to offer better prices and trade conditions to 
their distressed customers because they need to meet their own debt obligations. In this 
framework, we expect that suppliers prefer to contract long-term debt instead of short-term debt 
in order to provide more credibility to their argument. Based on these observations, we examine 
the behavior of short-term and long-term debt ratios prior to customer distress.  Table 6 presents 
 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative mechanism. 
24 
 
the result of the analysis of supplier book leverages using short-term (Model 1) and long-term 
(Model 2) book debt, normalized by total book assets, as dependent variables. The BeforeFiling 
dummy is set to 1 in years –2 and –1, following Model 1 of Table 4. The coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant for both definitions of the dependent variable; however, the results 
show that most of the increase in the leverage ratio is due to the increase in long-term debt (4.9% 
vs 1.8%), supporting primarily the bargaining power hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
both mechanisms — trade credit and bargaining power — may be at work in our setting, 
especially in the case of short-term debt. Thus, we analyze the dynamic characteristics of the 
trade credit in the time window of interest, that is, the years just before the customer applies for 
Chapter 11. 
Model 1 of Table 7 presents the results of the analysis of supplier trade credit in the two 
years before the customer files for Chapter 11.19 We use the same time dummies BeforeFiling, 
Transition, and AfterFiling as defined in Model 1 of Table 4 to study the behavior of trade credit 
when a significant customer experiences financial distress. We do not include any leverage 
measure as an explanatory variable, since their inclusion may mask the increase in accounts 
receivable, if debt is used to finance such increases. The results show that the coefficient for the 
BeforeFiling time dummy variable is positive but not significantly different from zero at the 
usual significance levels. Therefore, in our sample, suppliers of important distressed customers 
do not extend more trade credit, on average, during periods of customer distress. This evidence 
does not support the trade credit mechanism explanation for the increase in supplier book 
leverage during periods of financial distress of significant customers. 
 
19 In addition, we develop a univariate analysis tabulating the changes in suppliers’ Accounts Receivable/Sales and 
Accounts Payable/Costs of Good Sold, adjusted by either benchmark firm ratios or industry median ratios, from 
years –4 to +2. The results present no evidence of increase in these supplier ratios before the customer files for 
Chapter 11.    
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Next, we use a two-stage model to conduct a more detailed examination of whether trade 
credit can explain the increases in supplier financial leverage during periods of customer 
financial distress. In the first stage, we estimate the level of abnormal accounts receivable, and in 
the second stage we add this measure of abnormal accounts receivable as an explanatory variable 
in our leverage analysis to check whether it can account for the increase in supplier leverage 
during periods of customer financial distress. Model 2 of Table 7 is used to estimate the normal 
level of accounts receivable given the determinants of trade credit; the residuals from this model 
are used as the measure of abnormal accounts receivable. 
In the second stage analysis, we use the abnormal accounts receivable as an additional 
control in our primary model of Leverage (Eq. (1)). These estimates are presented in Table 8. 
Model 1 of Table 8 uses the total debt ratio as the dependent variable, previously defined as total 
book debt to total book assets. Models 2 and 3 are the decomposition in which the dependent 
variables are the short-term and long-term debt ratios. We observe that total leverage is 
positively related to the abnormal accounts receivable (Model 1). Thus, it appears that firms 
increase leverage to provide additional trade credit. However, the coefficient for the BeforeFiling 
dummy continues to be statistically significant even after controlling for the impact of trade 
credit on leverage. Thus, the previously documented significant increase in leverage during 
customer distress cannot be attributed to changes in trade credit.  
Next, we examine the results separately for short-term and long-term debt ratios of 
suppliers in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8. Not surprisingly, only the short-term debt ratio has a 
significant, positive relation to the use of trade credit. This positive relation is consistent with 
trade credit partially explaining the changes in short-term debt. Nonetheless, the coefficient for 
the BeforeFiling dummy is still positive and statistically significant even after controlling for the 
potential impact of changes in trade credit; comparing it with the corresponding coefficient value 
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reported in Table 6, there is no diminution in the increase in the short-term debt ratio during the 
period before a significant customer’s bankruptcy filing. Model 3 shows that the long-term debt 
ratio is unaffected by the level of abnormal accounts receivable and it has a positive coefficient 
for the BeforeFiling dummy, which is highly statistically significant. Thus, the trade credit-based 
explanation cannot fully account for the observed changes in supplier leverage during periods of 
customer distress. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the bargaining power hypothesis 
explanation of supplier leverage changes. 
  
4.3. Benchmark sample tests  
Next, we present evidence on whether changes in supplier leverage are driven by the 
dynamics in the supplier industry rather than customer financial distress. Table 9 presents the 
result of the analysis of supplier book leverage in the sample of benchmark suppliers in the same 
industry as suppliers in our treatment sample but whose customers do not file for bankruptcy. 
The BeforeFiling dummy variable is defined relative to the Chapter 11 filing date of the 
treatment customers in order to verify if the increase of leverage is specific to the treatment 
suppliers or if it is systematic to their industries. The coefficients of BeforeFiling dummies are 
positive, but not statistically significant at the usual levels. We also test several different 
definitions for the years of the dummy variables during the time window of interest, before and 
after the Chapter 11 filing (e.g., using three or four years before filing), during the reorganization 
time window, and after reemerging—with similar nonsignificant results. In sum, the benchmark 
sample is used as a control group in the same years we see the effects in the treatment sample, 
and we are not able to identify any effect on the benchmark suppliers’ leverage.20 Therefore, the 
 
20 Another commonly used technique for benchmark comparisons is Propensity Score Matching. The difficulty in 
our framework is to find one or more relevant conditioning variables, based on finance theory and empirical 
evidence, that affect both the propensity of customers in that participate in the event (customer files for Chapter 11) 
and the performance of suppliers (supplier increases leverage). 
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observed changes in supplier leverage in our sample cannot be attributed to industry-wide 
effects. Rather, it is unique to suppliers whose customers experience financial distress. 
 
4.4. Additional implications of the bargaining power hypothesis 
We examine two settings where suppliers have less motivation to adjust capital structure 
for bargaining power considerations. First, we investigate if supplier industry concentration, 
which may also proxy for bargaining power, has any effect on the results. Second, we investigate 
suppliers that do not have a continuing reported relationship with their distressed customers. The 
absence of a reported relationship after the distress years may be either due to the liquidation of 
the customers or due to the fact that sales to them are greatly diminished and they are no longer 
significant customers. In such cases, we do not expect suppliers to adjust their capital structure, 
because maintaining bargaining power with respect to such customers has no value. 
 
4.4.1. Analysis of effects of supplier industry concentration 
We are interested in gauging the effect of customer distress and bankruptcy on suppliers’ 
leverage in concentrated industries. Suppliers in highly concentrated industries do not need to 
fortify their bargaining power, or at least not as much as suppliers in less concentrated industries, 
because they already have enough power for negotiations with customers. Thus, we expect that 
suppliers in high concentration industries do not increase their leverage as much as suppliers in 
low concentration industries. We measure industry concentration by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, which is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms that operate in a 
business segment of the industry, defined by its four-digit SIC. 
We report in Table 10 the results of the analysis of the impact of supplier concentration. 
We create a new dummy, called HighSuppHefIndex, that receives the value of 1 if the supplier 
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industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index is in the top 25% of Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for our 
sample in the two years before customer filing, and zero otherwise. We include three new factors 
in the regressions, the interactions between our previous dummies and the new dummy 
HighSuppHefIndex, in order to segregate the effect for the suppliers in high-concentration 
industries. All the coefficients of these new independent variables are negative and, specifically 
for the interaction with the BeforeFiling dummy, it is statistically significant at the 10% level. A 
combined coefficient for BeforeFiling and for high industry-concentration suppliers indicates an 
increase in leverage of only 2.1%, instead of 5.5% for the total treatment sample. This result 
shows that a higher supplier industry concentration is associated with a substantially smaller 
increase in suppliers’ leverage in the distress years, consistent with the bargaining power 
hypothesis. 
 
4.4.2. Analysis of leverage changes for suppliers with distressed customers that are liquidated or 
become unimportant  
Suppliers have no incentives to adjust leverage for bargaining power reasons if they do 
not expect that they will continue to have a significant relationship with a distressed customer in 
the future. Therefore, we investigate suppliers that do not present a continuing reported 
relationship with their distressed customers. The absence of a reported relationship after the 
distress years may be either due to the liquidation of the customers or due to the fact that sales to 
them are greatly diminished and they are no longer significant customers. In both cases, we do 
not expect suppliers to adjust their capital structure, because maintaining bargaining power with 
respect to such customers has no value.  
First, we analyze leverage changes of suppliers whose distressed customers are liquidated 
during the Chapter 11 process. Table 11 reports these results in Column 1. The empirical 
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evidence indicates that suppliers do not increase their leverage before the customer files for 
Chapter 11 if the customer liquidates after the distress years. The coefficient of the BeforeFiling 
dummy is negative and not statistically significant. This result supports our assumption that 
suppliers increase their leverage only if they expect that the distressed customer will reemerge 
from Chapter 11. 
Second, from the sample of suppliers with customers that reorganized and reemerged 
from bankruptcy, we create a subsample of suppliers that end the relationship after the customer 
files for Chapter 11. The last report of a significant relationship with the distressed customer 
occurs before the bankruptcy filing. Thus, in these cases, suppliers in our sample either 
completely terminated their business relationship with the distressed customer or the relationship 
is no longer important, with sales representing less than 10% of total sales. We verify that these 
suppliers continue to report a relationship with at least one other customer after the distressed 
customer files for bankruptcy. Therefore, the lack of a reported relationship with the distressed 
customer is not due to the supplier changing its policy on naming significant customers. 
If the bargaining power theory describes supplier’s behavior in this setting, we predict 
that suppliers do not change capital structure in such situations, because they anticipate that their 
relationship with the distressed customer will not be important anymore. We supplement the 
sample considered in Column 1 of Table 11 with the sample of suppliers with reemerged 
customers that are no longer important and estimate Eq. (1) for this combined sample of 
suppliers. The results are reported in Column 2 of Table 11. As expected, the results for this 
sample confirm that suppliers do not increase leverage before the customer’s bankruptcy filing, 
when the relationship with the customer is either terminated or no longer significant.21  
 
21 One potential explanation for results in Table 4 is that there is a mechanical increase in supplier book leverage 
because the distress of a significant customer depresses the book value of supplier equity, perhaps due to lower 
profit margins. Results in Table 11 refute this possibility because we do not observe an increase in supplier book 
leverage prior to customer bankruptcy filing in these samples.  
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4.5. Ex-ante assessment of customers that are likely to reorganize versus liquidate  
We argue that a supplier will use leverage as a bargaining tool in negotiations only if it 
believes that its customer has substantial chances of recovery from distress. In Section 4.1, we 
investigate the sample of suppliers whose customers reemerged after Chapter 11 and we find that 
suppliers increase their leverage before the filing. Such an analysis assumes that suppliers can 
identify the customers that will successfully reemerge from Chapter 11.  
To relax this assumption of perfect foresight regarding the customer reorganization or 
liquidation decision, we rely on the forecast of the probability of customer reorganization using 
the coefficients from a binomial logistic regression (Model 2) presented in Kolay et al. (2015).22 
Table 12 reports the results. Panel A presents the summary statistics for calculated probabilities 
of reorganization for customers that reemerged and for customers that liquidated. The mean 
probability of reorganization for the group of reemerged customers is 0.607 and the 
corresponding mean for the liquidated customers is 0.445. The difference between the means of 
probabilities of reorganization between the two groups is significant at the 1% level. In Panel B 
(confusion matrix), we verify that this model can successfully predict reorganization for 79% of 
the customers that actually reorganized; similarly, it predicts liquidation for 65% of the 
customers that actually liquidated.23 
Using the predictions of this model, we conduct the analysis on a sample of suppliers 
whose customers are predicted to reemerge after reorganization. Table 13 presents the results, 
which are qualitatively similar to the original treatment sample comprising suppliers to 
customers that did in fact reorganize. Suppliers increase leverage by 4.4% in the years before 
 
22 This model is similar to Model 3 in Lemmon, Ma and Tashjian (2009).  
23 We classify customer firms as predicted to be reorganized (liquidated), if the probability of reorganization is 
greater (less) than 0.5.  
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customers file for Chapter 11 and return to previous levels after the bankruptcy filing.24 We also 
analyze leverage changes of suppliers whose customers are predicted by the model to liquidate, 
and the unreported results for this subsample indicate that suppliers do not increase their leverage 
before the customer files for Chapter 11. 
The model from Kolay et al. (2015) relies on public accounting information, which 
implies that its prediction is a more conservative estimate of the predictive capability of 
suppliers. Nevertheless, the results still support our conclusion that suppliers increase their 
leverage when a significant customer enters financial distress if they believe that the customer 
will likely reemerge from Chapter 11. 
 
5. Conclusion 
A distressed, large customer might put pressure on its under-diversified suppliers — for 
instance, to provide a larger discount or to accept late payments — especially if the customer 
believes that the suppliers have resource slack. Predicting this behavior, a supplier might take 
measures to increase its bargaining power as the customer prepares to formally file for 
bankruptcy. This paper investigates how economic or financial distress of a major customer can 
impact the strategic choices of capital structure of a supplier.  
Looking at customer firms that reemerged from bankruptcy after reorganizing, we find 
that their suppliers increase their leverage in the years before the filing date. This change is 
economically significant and consistent with the bargaining theory hypothesis proposed by 
 
24 We also estimate the probability of customer reorganization using a modified model from the original in Kolay et 
al. (2015). Their model employs variables such as industry-adjusted operating performance (EBITDA-to-assets) and 
R&D-to-assets ratio using the average of values in years –3 and –2, as well as industry distress and low GDP year 
dummies assessed in years 0 or –1. In our modified model, we omit variables that are assessed in years 0 and –1. 
Our intention is to test a prediction model which can be used to evaluate the probability of reorganization two years 
before the customer files for Chapter 11. Not surprisingly, this modified model is less accurate as it increases our 
number of predicted reorganized customers by six, but only two of these customers actually reorganized. 
Nevertheless, regression results are qualitatively similar for both models.   
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Bronars and Deere (1991), which states that an increase in debt decreases the surplus available 
for negotiations with nonfinancial stakeholders, thus increasing the firm’s bargaining power. In 
our setting, the supplier firm increases its debt when the bargaining power of its counterparty 
increases. The main concern for the supplier is to keep its strategic negotiation position as strong 
as possible if it believes that its customer has substantial chances of recovery. Suppliers’ 
bargaining power is especially relevant because distressed customers may be pressing their 
suppliers to give better trade conditions, such as reducing prices or extending credit. We also 
find that suppliers do not increase leverage in the years before customers’ Chapter 11 filing when 
customers are liquidated or if suppliers cease to report the distressed firm as a significant 
customer. If the supplier believes the customer will liquidate or become insignificant in terms of 
relative sales, there is no need for the supplier to fortify its bargaining power. Furthermore, we 
show that the use of debt to enhance bargaining power is lower for suppliers that are in high-
concentrated industries, compared to suppliers in less concentrated industries. 
We also investigate another possible explanation for the increase in supplier leverage: the 
trade credit mechanism. Suppliers may be inclined to offer trade credit and act as liquidity 
providers to their important customers in distress. We find no evidence that suppliers increase 
their accounts receivable before their distressed customer files for Chapter 11. Moreover, most of 
the increase in supplier leverage is due to an increase in long-term debt rather than short-term 
debt, which also does not support a trade credit mechanism argument. 
Additionally, we hypothesize and investigate if this strategic negotiation move is 
temporary, with the supplier returning to a previous relative status quo, probably inside a target 
range for leverage, after the distressed customer reorganizes and reemerges from Chapter 11. We 
find evidence that suppliers do indeed reduce their leverage after the customer reemerges from 
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Summary statistics—treatment sample. 
This table reports summary statistics for our sample during the period 1980–2013. The sample 
consists of suppliers whose significant customers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Panel A 
reports summary statistics for suppliers, Panel B reports summary statistics for customers that 
filed for bankruptcy, and Panel C reports the sample and sub-sample characteristics. Book 
Leverage is total debt divided by total book value of assets. Short-Term Leverage is short-term 
debt divided by total book value of assets. Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt divided by 
total book value of assets. Market Leverage is total debt divided by total market value of assets. 
Firm Size is the log of sales. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total 
assets. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of 
total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Accounts 
Receivable Ratio is accounts receivable divided by sales. All ratios were winsorized at 1% and 
99%. 
 
Panel A. Supplier summary statistics           
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
              
Book Leverage 1,664 0.25 0.21 0.23 0 1.00 
Short-Term Leverage 1,664 0.06 0.02 0.10 0 0.56 
Long-Term Leverage 1,664 0.19 0.13 0.22 0 1.00 
Market Leverage 1,664 0.31 0.23 0.29 0 1.07 
Size 1,664 5.58 5.39 1.89 2.30 10.46 
Tangibility 1,664 0.27 0.22 0.21 0 0.93 
Profitability 1,664 0.09 0.11 0.15 -1.20 0.64 
Market-to-Book 1,664 1.26 0.90 1.38 0.03 23.45 
R&D Intensity 1,664 0.03 0 0.07 0 0.82 
Accounts Receivable Ratio 1,664 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.35 
              
Panel B. Customer summary statistics           
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
              
Book Leverage 1,664 0.43 0.31 0.37 0 1.82 
Market Leverage 1,664 0.62 0.68 0.34 0 3.06 
Size 1,664 10.31 10.50 1.86 2.35 12.24 
Tangibility 1,664 0.37 0.33 0.20 0 0.82 
Profitability 1,664 0.10 0.10 0.09 -1.06 0.36 
Market-to-Book 1,664 0.93 0.65 0.80 0.0001 6.56 






Table 1 (continued) 
Panel C. Sample characteristics       













No. of Observations (Firm-years) 1,664 1,402 262 
No. of Supplier-Customer Pairs 163 129 34 
No. of Suppliers   156 125 33 







Summary statistics — benchmark sample. 
This table reports summary statistics for our benchmark sample during the period 1980-2013. 
The sample has all supplier-customer pairs in the same industries as the treatment firms, where 
the supplier-customer relationship was reported in the same time window as the treatment pairs, 
but the customers did not file for bankruptcy. Panel A reports summary statistics for the suppliers 
and Panel B for the customers. Panel C reports the sample characteristics. Book Leverage is total 
debt divided by total book value of assets. Short-Term Leverage is short-term debt divided by 
total book value of assets. Long-Term Leverage is long-term debt divided by total book value of 
assets. Market Leverage is total debt divided by total market value of assets. Firm Size is the log 
of sales. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability is 
EBITDA divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book 
assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. All ratios were winsorized at 1% 
and 99%. 
 
Panel A. Supplier summary statistics         
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
              
Book Leverage 786 0.22 0.19 0.21 0 1.00 
Short-Term Leverage 786 0.06 0.01 0.11 0 0.58 
Long-Term Leverage 786 0.16 0.09 0.19 0 0.81 
Market Leverage 786 0.25 0.17 0.26 0 1.01 
Size 786 5.32 5.03 1.67 2.32 9.88 
Tangibility 786 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.001 0.93 
Profitability 786 0.10 0.12 0.16 -1.57 0.42 
Market-to-Book 786 1.34 1.02 1.29 0.18 14.15 
R&D Intensity 786 0.04 0.002 0.07 0 0.59 
              
              
Panel B. Customer summary statistics         
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
              
Book Leverage 786 0.41 0.39 0.23 0 1.16 
Market Leverage 786 0.48 0.46 0.30 0 1.10 
Size 786 9.91 10.01 1.85 4.19 13.05 
Tangibility 786 0.39 0.29 0.23 0.05 0.92 
Profitability 786 0.15 0.13 0.09 -0.21 0.42 
Market-to-Book 786 2.07 1.05 2.97 0.28 20.11 





Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C. Sample characteristics   
    Benchmark 
Sample 
No. of Observations (Firm-years) 786 
No. of Supplier-Customer Pairs 93 
No. of Suppliers   86 






Univariate analysis of industry-adjusted suppliers book leverage. 
This table reports univariate analysis of industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers whose 
significant customers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Panel A reports the leverage for 
suppliers whose customers reemerged from bankruptcy, and Panel B reports the leverage for 
suppliers whose customers liquidated. Book Leverage is total debt divided by total book value of 
assets, adjusted by subtracting the industry median value. The p-values (reported in parentheses) 
are calculated from t-tests for the means and from Wilcoxon rank sum tests for the medians. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers with reemerged customers     
                    
  Year     
  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean 0.03 0.04 0.08*** 0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (0.30) (0.12) (0.009) (0.08) (0.65) (0.49) (0.81) (0.99) (0.45) 
Median 0.00 0.02 0.03* 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.69) (0.40) (0.07) (0.29) (0.33) (0.66) (0.35) (0.50) (0.95) 
                    
                    
Panel B. Industry-adjusted book leverage for suppliers with liquidated customers     
                    
  Year         
  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 
  (0.91) (0.87) (0.41) (0.40) (0.67) (0.84) (0.22) (0.99) (0.42) 
Median -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 







Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived. 
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing 
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after 
bankruptcy. In Model (1), BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 
relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero 
otherwise. In Model (2), BeforeFiling[–2] dummy is set to 1 in year –2 and zero otherwise, and 
BeforeFiling[–1] dummy is set to 1 in year –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and 
zero otherwise; the Transition dummy is set to 1 in years 0, 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. In all 
models, AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and 
zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. 
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the 
market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total 
assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 





  (1) (2) 
      
BeforeFiling 0.0547***   
  (3.232)   
BeforeFiling[-2]   0.0497** 
    (2.484) 
BeforeFiling[-1]   0.0604*** 
    (2.819) 
Transition 0.0364** 0.0373** 
  (2.149) (2.197) 
AfterFiling 0.0144 0.0152 
  (0.708) (0.747) 
Sizet-1 0.0408*** 0.0409*** 
  (4.442) (4.436) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0167*** -0.0168*** 
  (-3.994) (-4.083) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.209*** -0.210*** 
  (-3.279) (-3.283) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0560 0.0573 
  (0.856) (0.872) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.189* -0.189* 
  (-1.692) (-1.691) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.127** 0.126** 
  (2.130) (2.106) 
      
No. of observations 1,350 1,350 
R-squared 0.781 0.781 
Year FE Yes Yes 







Analysis of accounts receivable changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived. 
This table reports analysis of supplier accounts receivable before and after customer bankruptcy 
filing using supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after 
bankruptcy. In models 1 thru 3, the dependent variable (logarithm of the firm’s accounts 
receivable to sales ratio) and the controls are the same as Table II of Dass, Kale and Nanda 
(2015), supplemented by three additional control factors used by Molina and Preve (2009): 
accounts payable ratio, inventory ratio and sales growth. Relationship-specific investment 
measure (RSI) is R&D expense divided by lagged total assets. Operating profits is EBITDA 
divided by sales. Firm Size is the log of sales. Leverage measures are total book leverage (Model 
1), short-term book leverage (Model 2) or long-term book leverage (Model 3). Cash holdings 
ratio is cash held by the firm divided by its lagged total book assets. Market-to-Book is the 
market value of total assets to total book assets. Profitability is income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by 
total assets. Kaplan-Zingales Index is constructed as per Dass, Kale and Nanda (2015). It is equal 
to: 3.139x(Book Leverage) + 0.283x(Tobin’s Q) – 1.002x (Cashflow/Lagged Assets) – 
39.368x(Dividends) – 1.315x(Cash Holdings). Accounts payable ratio is accounts payable to cost 
of goods sold. Inventory ratio is inventory to cost of goods sold. Sales growth is the percent 
difference in sales from the previous year. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 






  (1) (2) (3) 
        
RSI (R&D-to-Assetst-1) 0.0826 0.0583 0.119 
  (0.110) (0.078) (0.158) 
EBITDA-to-Sales -0.0187 -0.0158 -0.0190 
  (-0.110) (-0.0935) (-0.112) 
Size -0.0645*** -0.0525** -0.0549** 
  (-2.756) (-2.358) (-2.379) 
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.237**     
  (2.392)     
Short-Term Debt/Total Assets   0.325**   
    (2.292)   
Long-Term Debt/Total Assets     -0.0269 
      (-0.337) 
Cash Holdings -0.452*** -0.417*** -0.446*** 
  (-3.671) (-3.371) (-3.622) 
Market-to-Book 0.0032 0.0005 -0.0007 
  (0.243) (0.038) (-0.054) 
Profitability 0.256* 0.244* 0.224 
  (1.743) (1.682) (1.552) 
Tangibility -0.435*** -0.423** -0.436** 
  (-2.607) (-2.495) (-2.570) 
Kaplan-Zingales Index -0.0387** -0.0229 -0.0151 
  (-2.188) (-1.632) (-0.937) 
Accounts Payable Ratio 0.475*** 0.478*** 0.484*** 
  (4.329) (4.402) (4.409) 
Inventory Ratio 0.314** 0.312** 0.320** 
  (2.023) (2.001) (2.030) 
Sales Growth 0.0628* 0.0644* 0.0660* 
  (1.731) (1.784) (1.820) 
        
No. of observations 1,250 1,250 1,250 
R-squared 0.844 0.844 0.843 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 






Analysis of short-term and long-term leverage changes of suppliers to distressed customers that 
survived. 
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing 
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after 
bankruptcy. In Model (1), the dependent variable is short-term debt to total book assets. In 
Model (2), the dependent variable is long-term debt to total book assets. BeforeFiling is a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, 
and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s 
Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the 
log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, 
and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total 
book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels based on p-values. 
 
  (1) (2) 
  STD/TA LTD/TA 
      
BeforeFiling 0.0184* 0.0492** 
  (1.678) (2.359) 
Transition 0.0243** 0.0055 
  (2.225) (0.266) 
AfterFiling 0.0105 -0.0004 
  (0.826) (-0.017) 
Sizet-1 -0.0011 0.0378*** 
  (-0.202) (2.955) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0054** -0.0091* 
  (-2.436) (-1.750) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.0868** -0.166** 
  (-2.473) (-2.501) 
Tangibilityt-1 -0.0197 0.0944 
  (-0.527) (1.163) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.0394 -0.229* 
  (-0.629) (-1.820) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.0044 0.156** 
  (0.098) (2.233) 
      
No. of observations 1,350 1,350 
R-squared 0.443 0.720 
Year FE Yes Yes 






Analysis of accounts receivable changes of suppliers to distressed customers that survived. 
This table reports analysis of supplier accounts receivable before and after customer bankruptcy 
filing using supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after 
bankruptcy. In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable (logarithm of the firm’s accounts 
receivable to sales ratio) and the controls are the same as Table II of Dass, Kale and Nanda 
(2015), supplemented by three additional control factors used by Molina and Preve (2009) in 
their model: accounts payable ratio, inventory ratio and sales growth. BeforeFiling is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero 
otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 
filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is 
set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Relationship-specific investment 
measure (RSI) is R&D expense divided by lagged total assets. Operating profits is EBITDA 
divided by sales. Firm Size is the log of sales. Cash holdings ratio is cash held by the firm 
divided by its lagged total book assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total 
book assets. Profitability is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Kaplan-Zingales Index 
is constructed as per Dass, Kale and Nanda (2015). It is equal to: 3.139x(Book Leverage) + 
0.283x(Tobin’s Q) – 1.002x (Cashflow/Lagged Assets) – 39.368x(Dividends) – 1.315x(Cash 
Holdings). Accounts payable ratio is accounts payable to cost of goods sold. Inventory ratio is 
inventory to cost of goods sold. Sales growth is the percent difference in sales from the previous 
year. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 




  (1) (2) 
      
BeforeFiling 0.0359   
  (0.821)   
Transition -0.0059   
  (-0.128)   
AfterFiling -0.0111   
  (-0.198)   
RSI (R&D-to-Assetst-1) 0.126 0.123 
  (0.166) (0.163) 
EBITDA-to-Sales -0.0276 -0.0217 
  (-0.162) (-0.128) 
Size -0.0559** -0.0559** 
  (-2.439) (-2.492) 
Cash Holdings -0.458*** -0.449*** 
  (-3.691) (-3.662) 
Market-to-Book -0.0006 -0.0005 
  (-0.048) (-0.043) 
Profitability 0.234 0.228 
  (1.597) (1.564) 
Tangibility -0.433** -0.436** 
  (-2.517) (-2.572) 
Kaplan-Zingales Index -0.0183 -0.0172 
  (-1.297) (-1.212) 
Accounts Payable Ratio 0.483*** 0.484*** 
  (4.280) (4.403) 
Inventory Ratio 0.316** 0.320** 
  (2.012) (2.031) 
Sales Growth 0.0665* 0.0659* 
  (1.829) (1.815) 
      
No. of observations 1,250 1,250 
R-squared 0.844 0.843 
Year FE Yes Yes 







Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers controlling for abnormal changes in trade credit. 
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage before and after customer bankruptcy filing 
using lagged supplier firm controls for the sample of suppliers whose customers remerged after 
bankruptcy. In Model (1), the dependent variable is total book leverage. In Model (2), the 
dependent variable is short-term debt to total book assets. In Model (3), the dependent variable is 
long-term debt to total book assets. BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 
and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, 
and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent 
years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total 
assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book 
is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by 
total assets. Abnormal A/R is the residual from the regression in Model 2 of Table 7. 
Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 





  (1) (2) (3) 
  Total Debt/TA STD/TA LTD/TA 
        
BeforeFiling 0.0687*** 0.0199* 0.0643*** 
  (3.813) (1.706) (3.073) 
Transition 0.0471*** 0.0293*** 0.0117 
  (2.604) (2.635) (0.559) 
AfterFiling 0.0319 0.0136 0.0143 
  (1.490) (1.053) (0.576) 
Sizet-1 0.0413*** -0.00562 0.0452*** 
  (3.552) (-0.962) (3.179) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0163*** -0.0057** -0.0075 
  (-3.446) (-2.331) (-1.298) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.201** -0.0658 -0.192** 
  (-2.522) (-1.623) (-2.380) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0579 0.0269 0.0240 
  (0.780) (0.756) (0.287) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.137 -0.012 -0.212 
  (-1.074) (-0.169) (-1.548) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.0797 -0.0061 0.111 
  (1.342) (-0.128) (1.626) 
Abnormal AR 0.0315* 0.0234** -0.0059 
  (1.911) (2.311) (-0.318) 
        
No. of observations 1,250 1,250 1,250 
R-squared 0.780 0.473 0.723 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 









Analysis of leverage changes of benchmark suppliers. 
This table reports analysis of supplier book leverage using lagged supplier firm controls for 
benchmark suppliers whose customers did not file for bankruptcy; the benchmark sample has all 
supplier-customer pairs in the same industries as the treatment firms. In Model (1), the dependent 
variable is total book leverage. In Model (2), the dependent variable is short-term debt to total 
book assets. In Model (3), the dependent variable is long-term debt to total book assets. 
BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s 
Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year 
of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size 
is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, 
plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets 
to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedastic-
robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Total Debt/TA STD/TA LTD/TA 
        
BeforeFiling 0.0261 0.0075 0.0111 
  (1.302) (0.530) (0.543) 
Transition 0.0159 0.0272* -0.0120 
  (0.673) (1.769) (-0.504) 
AfterFiling 0.0268 0.0405* -0.0143 
  (0.728) (1.785) (-0.430) 
Sizet-1 0.0897*** 0.0162* 0.0678*** 
  (6.177) (1.676) (5.479) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 0.00268 0.00286 -0.0059 
  (0.409) (0.886) (-1.585) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.360*** -0.0641 -0.248*** 
  (-4.885) (-1.533) (-4.589) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.174** 0.123*** 0.0635 
  (2.224) (3.098) (0.860) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.0758 -0.0202 -0.0191 
  (-0.636) (-0.286) (-0.184) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 -0.0911 0.0574 -0.152 
  (-1.042) (0.922) (-1.412) 
        
No. of observations 730 730 730 
R-squared 0.776 0.584 0.715 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 






Impact of industry concentration on supplier leverage responses to customer distress. 
This table reports the impact of supplier industry concentration on supplier book leverage for the 
sample of suppliers whose distressed customers remerged after Chapter 11 filing. BeforeFiling is 
a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, 
and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s 
Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. 
HighSuppHefIndex is a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 if the supplier industry 
Herfindahl index in the two years before customer bankruptcy filing is in the top 25% of 
Herfindahl Indices, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA 
divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. 
Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D 
expense divided by total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The 





    
    
BeforeFiling 0.0663*** 
  (3.612) 
Transition 0.0418** 
  (2.434) 
AfterFiling 0.0258 
  (1.215) 
BeforeFiling*HighSuppHefIndex -0.0454* 
  (-1.721) 
Transition*HighSuppHefIndex -0.0222 
  (-1.035) 
AfterFiling*HighSuppHefIndex -0.0435* 
  (-1.752) 
Sizet-1 0.0398*** 
  (4.287) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0170*** 
  (-4.095) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.206*** 
  (-3.230) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0535 
  (0.814) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.179 
  (-1.619) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.119** 
  (1.989) 
    
No. of observations 1,350 
R-squared 0.782 
Year FE Yes 






Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers with distressed customers that are liquidated or 
become unimportant. 
This table reports regression results of supplier book leverage on a before filing dummy and 
lagged supplier firm controls. The sample includes suppliers whose customers liquidated after 
filing for Chapter 11 (column1) or whose customers either liquidated or become unimportant 
(column 2) after the Chapter 11 filing. BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –
2 and –1 relative to the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy 
variable that is set to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, 
and zero otherwise. AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent 
years, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total 
assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book 
is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by 
total assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.  
  (1) (2) 
      
BeforeFiling -0.0209 -0.0010 
  (-0.573) (-0.033) 
Transition 0.0596 0.0439 
  (1.138) (1.137) 
AfterFiling 0.0496 0.0109 
  (0.713) (0.218) 
Sizet-1 -0.0157 0.0052 
  (-0.724) (0.261) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0125** -0.0221*** 
  (-2.380) (-5.829) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.0033 0.0143 
  (-0.051) (0.236) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0500 -0.137 
  (0.306) (-1.025) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 0.0424 -0.0718 
  (0.203) (-0.373) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.112 -0.0982 
  (0.635) (-0.667) 
      
No. of observations 248 363 
R-squared 0.734 0.715 
Year FE Yes Yes 






Probability of reorganization. 
This table presents the results of forecasting the probability of reorganization using the model in 
Kolay, Lemmon and Tashjian (2015). The table reports summary statistics of the calculated 
probability of reorganization for all customers that filed for Chapter 11 in our sample during the 
period 1980-2013. The customers were divided into two groups: firms that reorganized and a 
second group of firms that were either liquidated or acquired.  Panel A reports summary statistics 
for the customers, where Reorganization = 1 and Liquidation/M&A = 0. Panel B presents the 
confusion matrix.  
 
Panel A. Predicted probability of reorganization 
(Reorganize = 1, Liquidate/M&A = 0) 







Mean 0.607 0.445 4.239*** 
Median 0.600 0.434   
Std. Dev. 0.137 0.147   
Min 0.305 0.242   
Max 0.879 0.719   
N 35 22   
        
Panel B. Confusion matrix     
        
  Predicted   
Actual Reorganization Liquidation   
Reorganized 27 (79%) 7 (21%)   










Analysis of leverage changes of suppliers with distressed customers that are predicted to be 
reorganized. 
This table reports analysis of book leverage of suppliers whose distressed customers are 
predicted to be reorganized rather than liquidated using the model in Kolay, Lemmon and 
Tashjian (2015). BeforeFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in years –2 and –1 relative to 
the customer’s Chapter 11 filing, and zero otherwise. Transition is a dummy variable that is set 
to 1 in the year of customer’s Chapter 11 filing (year 0), in the years 1 and 2, and zero otherwise. 
AfterFiling is a dummy variable that is set to 1 in year 3 and all subsequent years, and zero 
otherwise.  Firm Size is the log of sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets. 
Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the 
market value of total assets to total book assets. R&D Intensity is R&D expense divided by total 
assets. Heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on p-values.  
    
    
BeforeFiling 0.0436*** 
  (2.948) 
Transition 0.0466*** 
  (3.012) 
AfterFiling 0.0157 
  (0.838) 
Firm Sizet-1 0.0440*** 
  (5.412) 
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.0168*** 
  (-5.509) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.197*** 
  (-4.157) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.0654 
  (1.040) 
R&D-to-Assetst-1 -0.188* 
  (-1.901) 
Industry Median Leveraget-1 0.138** 
  (2.502) 
    
No. of observations 1,353 
R-squared 0.781 
Year FE Yes 
Supplier FE Yes 
 
